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The Limits of Voice: Are Workers 
Afraid to Express Their Health and 
Safety Rights?
Wayne LeWchuk *
This article reconsiders the shift in canada from an exclusively government-regulated 
occupational health and safety system to the Internal Responsibility System (IRS). The IRS 
gives workers rights, or “voice,” to manage, know about, and refuse unsafe working 
conditions. I present new evidence that worker voice and the IRS have weakened with 
the decline of unions and the rise of precarious employment. Survey data are analyzed from 
Ontario workers who rated the likelihood that raising a health and safety concern with their 
current employer would negatively affect their future employment. My analysis models 
how workers’ sex, race, unionization, sector, and degree of employment precarity affect 
their probability of exercising voice. Results of a logistic regression suggest the most 
precariously employed are the least likely to use voice. consequently, I argue that the 
IRS should be supplemented with more external oversight in sectors where employment 
is most insecure.
cet article réexamine au canada le passage d’un système de santé et sécurité au travail 
réglementé exclusivement par le gouvernement à un système de responsabilité interne (SRI). 
Le SRI confère aux travailleurs des droits et leur donne la parole au moment de reconnaître, 
gérer, et refuser des conditions de travail non sécuritaires. Je présente de nouvelles preuves 
à l’effet que la voix des travailleurs et le SRI ont régressé avec le déclin des syndicats et la 
précarisation de l’emploi. Les données de sondage proviennent de travailleurs ontariens 
à qui on a demandé d’évaluer la probabilité selon laquelle manifester auprès de leur 
employeur actuel de l’inquiétude sur des questions de santé et sécurité aurait un impact 
* School of Labour Studies & Department of Economics, McMaster University. Marlea 
Clarke and Alice de Wolff were co-authors of an earlier project that is the foundation for 
this study. This article would not have been possible without them. Dale Brown provided 
assistance in framing the presentation. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of 
the author. Funding for this research was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada. An earlier version of this article was originally presented at the 
Voices At Work North American Workshop (16-17 March 2012), hosted at Osgoode Hall 
Law School, York University, Toronto and funded by the Leverhulme Trust, the Centre for 
Labour Management Relations at Ryerson University, and Osgoode Hall Law School.
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négatif sur l’avenir de leur emploi. Mon analyse modélise la manière dont le sexe, la race, la 
syndicalisation, le secteur, et la précarité de l’emploi d’un travailleur affectent la probabilité 
qu’il se fasse entendre. une analyse de régression logistique permet de conclure que les 
travailleurs dont l’emploi est le plus précaire sont les moins susceptibles de se faire 
entendre. Par conséquent, je fais valoir que le SRI devrait être assorti d’une plus grande 
surveillance externe dans les secteurs où prévaut la précarité de l’emploi.
In THE 1970s, moST CAnAdIAn juRISdICTIonS moved away from the external 
regulation of health and safety at work through codified regulations enforced 
by an independent inspectorate to the Internal Responsibility System (IRS). 
A central pillar of this new model of regulation was an assumption that 
workers could be active participants in the regulation of their own safety at work. 
Workers were given new rights to participate in health and safety decisions 
affecting their workplaces, to know about the risks they faced, and to refuse unsafe 
work. I refer to the exercise of these rights by workers as worker voice. Workers 
were to exercise their voice by participating on joint health and safety 
committees, by asking for information on the hazards to which they were 
exposed, or by declaring their work unsafe and refusing to work until conditions 
improved. The ability of workers to fulfill the role assigned to them under the 
IRS was contentious in the 1970s and continues to be debated. Research has 
shown that the labour-management context of individual workplaces influenced 
the effectiveness of worker voice and joint health and safety committees.1 
1. See Wayne Lewchuk, Leslie A Robb & Vivienne Walters, “The Effectiveness of Bill 70 and 
Joint Health and Safety Committees in Reducing Injuries in the Workplace: The Case of 
Ontario” (1996) 22:3 Can Pub Pol’y 225; Garry C Gray, “A Socio-Legal Ethnography of the 
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In particular, voice was more effective where labour was organized and where 
management had accepted a philosophy of co-management of the health and 
safety function.
As argued by others,2 the pluralist assumptions underlying regulatory 
approaches, such as the IRS in Canada, that rely on worker voice to advance 
workplace health and safety are suspect. Others have already shown how the 
manifestation of voice as the right to refuse dangerous work and to raise health 
and safety issues is inherently constrained by pressure to produce.3 Nonetheless, 
we have witnessed a continued degradation of external regulatory mechanisms 
dealing with workplace health and safety and even a shift to what Garry C. Gray 
has described as a “responsibilization strategy” through the implementation of a 
“ticket” system in some Ontario workplaces.4 In this system, individual workers 
are not only being asked to participate in improving their own safety at work, 
their failure to do so could result in the issuance of a ticket exposing them to 
substantial fines.5
However, the significant reorganization of the Canadian economy since the 
1970s may make the exercise of worker voice at work even more problematic, 
raising serious questions about the increasing reliance on self-regulation of 
Right to Refuse Dangerous Work” (2002) 24 Stud Law, Pol & Soc’y 133 [Gray, “Socio-Legal 
Ethnography”]; John O’Grady, “Joint Health and Safety Committees: Finding a Balance” 
in Terrance Sullivan, ed, Injury and the New World of Work (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000) 
162; Christian Lévesque, “State Intervention in Occupational Health and Safety: Labour-
Management Committees Revisited” in Anthony Giles, Anthony E Smith & Kurt Wetzel, 
eds, Proceedings of the XXXIst Conference (Canadian Industrial Relations Association, 1994) 
217; Carolyn Tuohy & Marcel Simard, The Impact of Joint Health and Safety Committees 
in Ontario and Quebec (Study prepared for the Canadian Association of Administrators of 
Labour Law, 1993); Alan Hall et al, “Making a Difference: Knowledge Activism and Worker 
Representation in Joint OHS Committees” (2006) 61:3 Indus Rel 408.
2. See Steve Tombs & David Whyte, “A Deadly Consensus: Worker Safety and Regulatory 
Degradation under New Labour” (2010) 50:1 Brit J Crim 46; Vivienne Walters & Ted Haines, 
“Workers’ Use and Knowledge of the ‘Internal Responsibility System’: Limits to Participation 
in Occupational Health and Safety” (1988) 14:4 Can Pub Pol’y 411; Vivienne Walters & Ted 
Haines, “Workers’ Perceptions, Knowledge and Responses Regarding Occupational Health and 
Safety: A Report on a Canadian Study” (1988) 27:11 Soc Sci Med 1189.
3. See Gray, “Socio-Legal Ethnography,” supra note 1; Jane Mullen, “Testing a Model of 
Employee Willingness to Raise Safety Issues” (2005) 37:4 Can J Behav Sci 273.
4. “The Responsibilization Strategy of Health and Safety” (2009) 49:3 Brit J Crim 326 
[Gray, “Responsibilization”].
5. See ibid; Tombs & Whyte, supra note 2. As of 2012, the fine attached to a ticket was 295 
Canadian dollars (“CAD”). See Gray, “Responsibilization,” supra note 4 at 332, n 6.
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workplace health and safety. Competition between companies has increased as a 
result of the trade deals entered into in the 1980s and 1990s. Exports represent 
a much larger share of Canadian Gross National Product (GNP). Union density 
has fallen and, at the same time, the sectors where unions are still reasonably 
well established have come under increased competitive pressures. Non-standard 
employment, self-employment, and other forms of less permanent employment 
have all grown in relative importance.
This article will present new evidence on the effectiveness of worker voice and 
the Internal Responsibility System in Canada in this new context. Others have 
looked at how voice is constrained by social dynamics at work, by the pressure 
to maintain production at all costs, by workers’ concerns about self-image if they 
complain that work is dangerous, and by views regarding the likelihood that 
management will effect change if issues are raised.6 I focus on worker views of the 
impact of using voice on future employment prospects in the context of a labour 
market where employment is increasingly precarious. Data are drawn from a 
survey of workers in Ontario conducted by my colleagues and I in 2005.
This article has five parts. Part I introduces the social, economic, and political 
conditions that have shaped the IRS and worker voice in Canada. Part II sets 
out the survey’s methodological features and data sources. Part III presents 
the analysis and results. It explores the relationship between various worker 
characteristics (e.g., union membership) and participants’ self-rated likelihood 
that exercising voice with their current employer would negatively affect their 
future employment. Part IV assesses the significance of the results with a view to 
understanding the limits of both worker voice and the IRS in the light of current 
labour market conditions. Results of a logistic regression suggest that it is the 
precariously employed, rather than non-unionized individuals, for example, who 
are the most likely to believe that exercising voice jeopardizes future employment. 
I argue that the IRS is less likely to deliver safer and healthier workplaces for 
these workers. Part V reviews the article’s major limitations and findings before 
concluding with a recommendation for more external regulation and oversight 
of occupational health and safety and diminished reliance on the IRS in sectors 
where employment is insecure.
6. See Gray, “Socio-Legal Ethnography,” supra note 1; Mullen, supra note 3.
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I. BACkgRound
A. WoRkER VoICE And THE REguLATIon of oCCupATIonAL HEALTH 
And SAfETy In CAnAdA
Prior to the mid-1970s, the emphasis in most jurisdictions in Canada was on 
protecting workers’ health via government regulations enforced by government-
appointed factory inspectors, sometimes referred to as the External Responsibility 
System. Growing dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of this system within the 
ranks of labour led to calls for more participatory rights for workers. The initial 
push for change came less from the ranks of senior union officials and more from 
a group of young activists voicing their concerns within the workplace.7 These 
young activists began making health and safety a priority at their workplaces and 
within the union movement. Supported by political allies in government, they 
succeeded in getting several Canadian jurisdictions to pass new health and safety 
regulations in the mid-1970s.
The call for change was strongest in the unionized and male-dominated 
sectors, such as mining and heavy industry. Most of these workers were employed 
under standard employment contracts in jobs that were full-time, permanent, 
and relatively well-paid. Workers were concerned about a range of health 
and safety issues related to work, but at the forefront were exposures to toxic 
substances—including sulphur dioxide gas, asbestos, silica, and radon gas—and 
violent accidents in underground mines or steel mills. The health and safety 
concerns of women, racial minorities, and workers in precarious employment 
relationships were addressed only where they were similar to those of this largely 
male, unionized, full-time industrial workforce. Workplace hazards such as stress, 
harassment, and employment insecurity were barely on the radar at this time.
In 1974, the government of Ontario8 appointed the Ham Commission to 
investigate the causes of workplace injury in the province. The Ham Report, 
issued in 1976, was critical of the efficacy of a regulatory system that relied 
heavily on standards codified in laws and enforced by an external inspectorate.9 
For Ham, the key weakness of the existing regulatory framework was the 
ineffectiveness of an underdeveloped “responsibility-system,” resulting from the 
7. See Robert Storey, “Activism and the Making of Occupational Health and Safety Law in 
Ontario, 1960s-1980” (2005) 3:1 Pol’y & Prac in Health & Safety 41.
8. In Canada, responsibility for regulating workplace health and safety is largely a provincial 
matter, although certain classes of workers are regulated by federal legislation.
9. Ontario, Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines (Toronto: 
Ministry of the Attorney General, 1976) (Commissioner: James M Ham) [Ham Report].
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inability of labour to voice its concerns and to contribute to making workplaces 
safer. Ham argued, “[T]he worker as an individual and workers collectively in 
labour unions or otherwise have been denied effective participation in tackling 
these problems; thus the essential principles of openness and natural justice have 
not received adequate expression.”10
In Ontario, the passage of the Occupational Health and Safety Act11 (Bill 70) 
in 1978 was the first step in moving to an Internal Responsibility System. As 
defined in a Workplace Safety and Insurance Board fact sheet, “The Internal 
Responsibility System is a health and safety philosophy. It is based on the 
principle that every individual in the workplace is responsible for health and 
safety. That includes the CEO, executives, management and the workers.”12 The 
document goes on to state that under this system, workers are expected to know 
about hazards at work, to participate in workplace health and safety, to practice 
safe working procedures, and to report unsafe conditions.13 The system can only 
function if workers are willing to speak up about hazards and demand changes. 
They need to exercise voice at work.
To facilitate this new role for workers, Bill 70 mandated the formation of 
joint health and safety committees in most workplaces, required most companies 
to allow worker health and safety representatives, gave workers rights to know 
about the hazards they faced, and gave them the right to refuse dangerous work. 
Most other provinces adopted similar legislation.14 To a significant extent, the 
IRS and worker voice became substitutes for the External Responsibility System. 
Evidence of this can be seen in the decline of government-regulated workplace 
inspections in Ontario by the mid-1990s to less than one-third of their level in 
the early 1970s, despite the growth in the economy.15 As enforcement activity by 
10. Ibid at 6.
11. SO 1978, c 83 (proclaimed on 1 October 1979).
12. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, Internal Responsibility System, Fact Sheet 
3171A (WSIB Ontario, 2003) at 1, online: <http://www.wsib.on.ca/files/Content/
Downloadable%20File3171A/3171A_Internal_Responsibility_System.pdf>.
13. Ibid at 1.
14. See e.g. O’Grady, supra note 1; Eric Tucker, “Diverging Trends in Worker Health and Safety 
Protection and Participation in Canada, 1985-2000” (2003) 58:3 Indus Rel 395; Eric 
Tucker, “Remapping Worker Citizenship in Contemporary Occupational Health and Safety 
Regimes” (2007) 37:1 Int’l J Health Services 145.
15. See ibid. In 2007, the Ministry of Labour hired two hundred new workplace inspectors, 
nearly doubling their ranks. See Ministry of Labour, News Release, “McGuinty Government 
Completes Hiring of New Inspectors” (17 April 2007), online: Canada Newswire <http:// 
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external agencies declines, more of the burden is placed on self-regulation and 
the willingness of workers to be active members in regulating the conditions that 
affect their own safety.
From its inception, the IRS in Canada gave workers and unions limited 
voice with respect to health and safety matters at the workplace. The 1970s round 
of health and safety legislation defined the right to know weakly and limited joint 
health and safety committees to consultative and advisory roles. The effectiveness 
of these instruments, from the perspective of workers, was always contingent on 
how much pressure workers could apply and this was almost always a function 
of how strong their union was.16 On paper, joint health and safety committees 
were to have access to information associated with potential hazards and 
actual accidents, had the right to be present when a government inspection took 
place, and were to participate in investigations of accidents and work refusals. In 
practice, these paper rights were much more limited. A series of conflicts over 
health and safety in the 1980s is testament to the ongoing tension between labour 
and management over the issues of worker safety and the limited effectiveness of 
the new regulatory framework.17
A second wave of health and safety legislation and regulations in the 1980s 
focussed on strengthening labour’s voice in health and safety matters.18 Federal 
legislation strengthened the right to know with the creation of the Workplace 
Hazardous Materials Information System (WHMIS) in 1988.19 Two years 
later, changes to Ontario regulations made joint health and safety committees 
mandatory at more workplaces, required committee members to be trained, and 
empowered certified committee members to stop work that they perceived to be 
dangerous. The Workplace Health and Safety Agency, a joint labour-management 
body to oversee health and safety training in Ontario, was created in 1990. 
www.newswire.ca/en/story/88177/mcguinty-government-completes-hiring-of-new 
inspectors>. Despite this increase, the province remains committed to the IRS to achieve its 
goal of improving workplace health and safety.
16. See Lewchuk, Robb & Walters, supra note 1; O’Grady, supra note 1; Robert Storey & Eric 
Tucker, “All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: Worker Participation and Occupational Health and 
Safety Regulation in Ontario, 1970-2000” in Vernon Morgensen, ed, Worker Safety Under 
Siege: Labor, Capital, and the Politics of Workplace Safety in a Deregulated World (Armonk, NY: 
ME Sharpe, 2006) 157.
17. See Doug Smith, Consulted to Death (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring, 2000).
18. See Storey & Tucker, supra note 16.
19. Coordinate federal, provincial, and territorial legislation established WHMIS in law. See 
Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety, WHMIS – General: OSH Answers (18 
January 2012), online: <http://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/legisl/intro_whmis.html>.
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These initiatives had barely begun to function when a new right-wing 
Conservative government was elected in the province in 1995. On the surface, 
the workplace regulatory framework of the Internal Responsibility System was 
largely unchanged. However, the changing ideological orientation of the new 
government led to greater reliance on employer self-regulation, a lesser role for 
government intervention, and a weaker commitment to worker participation. 
Bipartite initiatives were abandoned or scaled back, inspectors were allowed to 
deal with work refusals over the phone, and it was made clear that labour would 
have to be more “flexible” to attract new investment to the province.20
Recent research supports the view that the focus of the Internal Responsibility 
System during this period moved away from workers as active participants. 
Comparing the results of questionnaires completed in 1990 and 2001, Sybil 
Geldart, Harry S. Shannon, and Lynne Lohfeld argue that senior managers had 
become less likely to view worker participation as important in improving safety 
and that workers felt that management cooperation on this issue had declined.21 
They conclude, “Management now perceives workers as less (rather than more) 
important for helping them make company decisions, while workers now see 
their joint involvement in company programs as more (rather than less) of a 
problem for management.”22
Worker voice and the IRS were adopted in Canada at a unique historical 
moment. The labour movement was near its post-war peak in terms of influence 
and the standard employment relationship was widespread. Workers in a number 
of economic sectors felt sufficiently secure that they were willing to demand 
changes to protect their health and to play more of a role in voicing their 
concerns to management. Where unions had effectively organized workers or 
where management was willing to co-manage the health and safety function 
with workers, the IRS had the potential to reduce injuries.23 However, for 
many workers outside the organized labour movement or working at firms where 
management kept a firm grip on management rights, the shift from external 
protection to voice and internal responsibility had more limited effects. The 
small gains in participatory rights came at the cost of a general retreat by the 
government from its role as regulator.
20. See Storey & Tucker, supra note 16.
21. “Have Companies Improved Their Health and Safety Approaches Over the Last Decade? A 
Longitudinal Study” (2005) 47:3 Am J Indus Med 227.
22. Ibid at 234.
23. See Lewchuk, Robb & Walters, supra note 1; O’Grady, supra note 1; Lévesque, supra note 1; 
Tuohy & Simard, supra note 1; Hall et al, supra note 1.
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More than three decades after the introduction of the IRS, Ontario 
appointed a review panel to assess the effectiveness of the province’s occupational 
health and safety regulatory framework. In early December 2010, the review 
panel issued its final report. The report’s authors suggested that their 
recommendations had the potential to “set in place an important cultural shift 
that could not be achieved through any amount of regulation.”24 In their view, 
“Dr. Ham got it right” that the government could set standards but could not 
be in every workplace to enforce them.25 The IRS would continue to play a key 
role in making workplaces safer, but there was a need to reinforce the three 
fundamental requirements of a successful Internal Responsibility System first 
articulated by Ham: the right to know, the right to participate, and the right 
to refuse unsafe work.26 There was to be no return to external regulation. Given 
this conclusion, it becomes increasingly important to assess the extent to which 
worker voice can play a role in making workplaces safer and healthier.
B. unIonS, pRECARIouS EmpLoymEnT, And WoRkER VoICE In HEALTH 
And SAfETy
The concerns of unionized, male workers in standard employment relationships 
were central to the introduction of the Internal Responsibility System in the 
late 1970s. While this class of workers was typical of the Canadian labour force 
in the 1970s, it is no longer so today when fewer than two-thirds of Canadian 
workers are in standard employment relationships.27 Various economic and policy 
developments over the last three decades have altered the context in which 
workers are seeking to protect their health. Trade liberalization has exposed 
Canadian companies to more external competition while at the same time 
making them more reliant on export markets. In 1970, less than one-fifth of 
Canadian GNP was destined for the export market. By 2000, this share had 
peaked at over 45% of GNP before gradually declining to around 35% by 2007.28 
24. Ontario, Expert Advisory Panel on Occupational Health and Safety, Report and 
Recommendations to the Minister of Labour (Toronto: Ministry of Labour, 2010) at 2, online: 
<http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/hs/pdf/eap_report.pdf>.
25. Ibid at 6.
26. Ibid.
27. In a recent report on precarious employment in the GTA–Hamilton region, it was estimated 
that barely half of all those working in late 2011 had permanent full-time jobs with a 
single employer who both paid a wage and provided other benefits. See Wayne Lewchuk 
et al, It’s More than Poverty: Precarious Employment and Household Well-being (Poverty and 
Employment Precarity in Southern Ontario, 2013) at 19, online: <http://www.pepso.ca>.
28. Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts Quarterly Estimates: Fourth 
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During the same period, union density fell by almost one-quarter from a peak 
of nearly 40% of the non-agricultural workforce in the mid-1980s to around 
30% by 2010.29
Of equal relevance to this article are the changes in the structure of 
Canadian labour markets.30 The proportion of the workforce listed as self- 
employed has more than doubled since the mid-1970s and now represents 
over 15% of the workforce.31 Part-time employment has increased and now 
represents about one-fifth of all employees, double the proportion that existed 
when the IRS was first introduced.32 Finally, there has been an increase in the 
prevalence of temporary employment, which has risen from around 14% of 
the workforce in the late 1980s to 20% by the mid-2000s.33 Research suggests 
that workers in precarious employment relationships are likely to face a number 
of factors that both increase the risk of injury and illness and make voice and 
existing regulatory frameworks less effective in protecting their health at work.34
Quarter 2007, vol 55, no 4 (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2008) at 104-107, online: <http://
www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/13-001-x/13-001-x2007004-eng.pdf>.
29. Commission for Labor Cooperation, Briefing Note: Recent Trends in Union Density in North 
America (Washington: Commission for Labor Cooperation, August 2003), online: <http://
www.naalc.org/english/pdf/april_03_english.pdf>; Sharanjit Uppal, “Unionization 2010” 
in Statistics Canada, Perspectives on Labour and Income, vol 11, no 10 (Ottawa: Minister of 
Industry, October 2010) 18.
30. See Frank T Denton, “Section D: The Labour Force” in Statistics Canada, Historical Statistics 
of Canada, No 11-516-X (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1983), series D236-259, online: 
<http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/bsolc/olc-cel/olc-cel?catno=11-516-X&lang=eng>; Judy Fudge, 
Eric Tucker & Leah Vosko, The Legal Concept of Employment: Marginalizing Workers (Ottawa: 
Law Commission of Canada, 2002), online: Government of Canada Publications <http://
www.publications.gc.ca>; Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey 1976-2012, Public-use 
Microdata Files (Ottawa: Minister of Industry) [Statistics Canada, Survey].
31. Ibid. See e.g. Statistics Canada, Labour Force Information: December 2 to 8, 2012, No 71-001-
X (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2013) at 28 [Statistics Canada, Information].
32. Statistics Canada, Survey, supra note 30. See e.g. Statistics Canada, Information, supra note 31 
at 26, 29-30.
33. Leah F Vosko & Lisa F Clark, “Canada: Gendered Precariousness and Social Reproduction” 
in Leah F Vosko, Martha MacDonald & Iain Campbell, eds, Gender and the Contours 
of Precarious Employment (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009) 26 at 30. As is common, 
temporary employment includes full-time, part-time, and solo self-employed.
34. See David Weil, “Rethinking the Regulation of Vulnerable Work in the USA: A Sector-based 
Approach” (2009) 51:3 J Indus Rel 411; David Weil, “Enforcing Labor Standards in Fissured 
Workplaces: The US Experience” (2011) 22:2 Econ & Lab Rel Rev 33; Neil Gunningham, 
“Occupational Health and Safety, Worker Participation and the Mining Industry in a 
Changing World of Work” (2008) 29:3 Econ & Indus Democ 336; Marlea Clarke et al, 
“‘This Just Isn’t Sustainable’: Precarious Employment, Stress and Workers’ Health” (2007) 
30:4-5 Int’l J L & Psychiatry 311; Stephanie Bernstein et al, “Precarious Employment 
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Differences between the labour relations contexts of permanent full-time 
workers and workers in precarious employment relationships are critical to 
understanding the efficacy of voice in protecting the latter workers’ health and 
safety. The precariously employed have relatively weak entitlements to further 
employment with their current employer and have little recourse in labour law 
if their employment is terminated. They are less likely to be unionized and less 
likely to have an ongoing relationship with either an employer or a group of 
co-workers. Lower rates of unionization and weaker ongoing links to co-workers 
make those in precarious employment relationships more vulnerable to 
retribution for defending their legal rights. As summarized by John O’Grady:
Without the protection of a grievance system, few workers will be inclined to 
exercise their statutory right to refuse to perform unsafe work. Similarly, only a small 
minority of non-union members of health and safety committees will summon 
inspectors to rectify persistent non-compliance with standards. While near 
universal unionization was not a presumption of the internal responsibility system, 
widespread unionization—at least in high incidence sectors—was an unstated 
premise of that system. Indeed, trying to understand the system of internal 
responsibility and the role of the right to refuse without recognizing the central 
importance of unions is like trying to put on a production of Hamlet, but leaving 
out the ghost. … For an increasing number of workers—increasing both absolutely 
and relatively—the unstated premise of the internal responsibility system, that is, 
the presence of a union, no longer holds.35
A study of Swedish workers reported that workers in precarious employment 
relationships were less likely to be knowledgeable about their work environment, 
felt they were less likely to receive training, and felt it was more difficult for them 
to be critical at work.36
and the Law’s Flaws: Identifying Regulatory Failure and Securing Effective Protection 
for Workers” in Leah F Vosko, ed, Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour Market 
Insecurity in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006) 203; David Walters 
& Kaj Frick, “Worker Participation and the Management of Occupational Health and 
Safety: Reinforcing or Conflicting Strategies?” in Kaj Frick et al, eds, Systematic Occupational 
Health and Safety Management: Perspectives on an International Development (Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Science, 2000) 43; Michael Quinlan & Claire Mayhew, “Precarious Employment, 
Work Re-Organization and the Fracturing of OHS Management” in ibid, 175.
35. Supra note 1 at 191.
36. Gunnar Aronsson, “Contingent Workers and Health and Safety” (1999) 13:3 Work, Employ 
& Soc’y 439.
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II. mETHodS
A. AImS And HypoTHESES
In Part I, I described how the health and safety regulatory framework imple-
mented in the 1970s in Ontario gave workers a role in minimizing health 
and safety risks at work. The three key pillars of that framework— the right 
to participate, the right to know, and the right to refuse—all assumed that 
workers, as individuals, would be willing to exercise these rights. I described 
this as individual workers using voice to affect health and safety improvements. 
The decline in union power since the 1970s and the rise of precarious 
employment suggest that a renewed evaluation of the effectiveness of the Internal 
Responsibility System is necessary.
Part III, below, uses data from a 2005 study on the health impacts of 
different types of employment relationships to evaluate the overall effectiveness 
of voice and the IRS in light of the changes in employment relationships. 
I focus on respondents’ answers to a key question in that survey: whether raising 
a health and safety issue with one’s current employer would negatively affect one’s 
future employment.37 Participants were instructed to select one of the following 
responses: very likely, likely, somewhat likely, not likely, or not likely at all. 
Responses were coded as “yes” where participants answered either very likely, 
likely, or somewhat likely and “no” where participants answered either not likely 
or not likely at all. It was assumed that workers who anticipated negative effects 
would also be less likely to use voice. I hypothesize that being in a precarious 
employment relationship increases a worker’s likelihood of agreeing that raising a 
health and safety concern would negatively affect his or her future employment. 
I also test whether concern about raising a health and safety issue is associated 
with different health outcomes.
37. Specifically, participants were asked the following question: “If you were to raise a health 
and safety concern with your current employer(s) would this negatively affect your               
future employment?”
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B. SuRVEy dESIgn And dATA SouRCES
The data were collected through a fixed response, self-administered 
questionnaire conducted between September and December of 2005.38 The 
questionnaire measured participants’ work conditions, employment relationships, 
and health indicators. The questionnaires were initially solicited from sixty 
Toronto-area census tracts representing 145,109 households. All households in 
the selected census tracts received a multilingual postcard inviting all members 
of the household over the age of eighteen who had worked in the previous 
month to participate. Participants were offered 10 CAD for completing the 
questionnaire, which they could mail in, submit by e-mail, or complete online. 
Questionnaires were available in English, Mandarin, and Tamil. Posters with 
tear-off information sheets were posted in public spaces in the targeted areas 
to encourage more individuals to participate. Those who completed the 
questionnaire were asked to distribute additional postcards to people who 
they thought might be interested in completing the questionnaire. As a result, 
the sample expanded to include several hundred individuals living outside 
Southern Ontario.
The analysis in Part III, below, uses the 3,280 surveys received from 
individuals who worked for pay in the month prior to the survey. Over 
80% of the sample lived in the Toronto–Hamilton corridor. The sample 
includes surveys from individuals who described themselves as employed in 
one of six employment relationship categories: less permanent39 (n=666), 
fixed contract of one year or more (n=177), self-employed with employees (n=23), 
self-employed without employees (n=225), permanent part-time (n=449), and 
permanent full-time (n=1,740).
38. For more on this survey, see Wayne Lewchuk, Marlea Clarke & Alice de Wolff, “Working 
Without Commitments: Precarious Employment and Health” (2008) 22:3 Work, 
Employ & Soc’y 387; Wayne Lewchuk, Marlea Clarke & Alice de Wolff, Working Without 
Commitments: The Health Effects of Precarious Employment (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2011) [Lewchuk, Clarke & de Wolff, Without Commitments].
39. Defined as employed through a temporary employment agency or on a short-term contract 
of less than one year. Employment could be either full-time or part-time, but in either case 
the relationship is temporary.
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III. RESuLTS And AnALySIS
A. WHo IS ABLE To uSE VoICE To ExpRESS HEALTH And SAfETy 
ConCERnS AT WoRk?
Figure 1 reports the percentage of respondents who agreed that raising a health 
and safety concern, making a WSIB claim, or raising a concern about employment 
rights with their current employer would negatively affect their future 
employment. About one-third of respondents reported that raising a health 
and safety issue at work would negatively affect their future employment. 
Participants were even more likely to see making a WSIB claim or raising a 
concern about employment rights as leading to negative effects on employment.
fIguRE 1: TAkIng THIS ACTIon WITH CuRREnT EmpLoyER WouLd nEgATIVELy 
AffECT fuTuRE EmpLoymEnT (% AgREEmEnT)40
NOTES: Raising a Health and Safety Concern (n=3,277), Making a Worker 
Compensation Claim (n=3,272), and Raising an Employment Rights Concern 
(n=3,277). Suggested examples of employment rights concerns included concerns 
about minimum wage, overtime pay, length of breaks, parental leave, harassment, 
holiday pay, and notice of layoffs.
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Figure 2 explores how gender, race, and unionization are associated with 
concern that raising a workplace health and safety issue would negatively affect 
future employment.41 While white workers were less concerned than non-white 
workers that raising a health and safety issue with their current employer would 
negatively affect their future employment, it was men rather than women and 
unionized workers rather than non-unionized workers who were most likely to 
report that voicing a health and safety concern would have negative implications 
for future employment. The high percentage of men and unionized workers 
expressing concern about using their voice in health and safety matters will be 
discussed in more detail in Part IV, below.
fIguRE 2: RAISIng A HEALTH And SAfETy ConCERn WITH CuRREnT EmpLoyER 
WouLd nEgATIVELy AffECT fuTuRE EmpLoymEnT By gEndER, RACE, And 
unIonIzATIon (% AgREEmEnT)
NOTE: The reported differences between Male (n=1,572) and Female (n=1,702), 
between White (n=1,889) and Non-White (n=1,385), and between Union 
(n=794) and Non-Union (n=2,480) are all statistically significant at p<.001 
(Pearson’s Chi-squared).
41. Respondents were asked to define their race from a list of nine options. Respondents were 
coded as Non-White if they answered anything other than White. Respondents were coded 
as Union if they reported being union members at all or at some of the places where they 
work. The Union category includes 566 (17.3%) respondents who reported that all places 
where they currently worked were unionized. Another 228 (6.7%) reported that only some 
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Figure 3 reports concern that raising a health and safety issue would 
negatively affect future employment by sector. While those in the public sector 
were marginally less likely to report this concern and those in manufacturing and 
construction were marginally more likely, these differences were not statistically 
significant. As I show in Part III(B), below, there is a much stronger association 
between reported levels of employment insecurity and reported concern that 
raising a health and safety issue with a current employer would negatively 
affect future employment than there is between the latter and any of the other 
explanatory variables.
fIguRE 3: RAISIng A HEALTH And SAfETy ConCERn WITH CuRREnT EmpLoyER 
WouLd nEgATIVELy AffECT fuTuRE EmpLoymEnT By SECToR (% AgREEmEnT)
NOTE: The reported differences among Technical & Management (n=1,317), Public 
Sector (n=588), Retail & Service (n=445), and Manufacturing & Construction 
(n=926) are not statistically significant at p>.10 (Pearson’s Chi-squared).
Figure 4 reports workers’ agreement that voicing a health and safety 
concern with their current employer would negatively impact their future 
employment by degree of employment precarity. I use a measure of precarity 
that I developed with Marlea Clarke and Alice de Wolff.42 It includes 
an Employment Relationship Uncertainty Index constructed from thirteen 
questions that measure uncertainty about future employment, uncertainty 
about future income, and scheduling uncertainty. The measure also includes an 
Employment Relationship Effort Index constructed from sixteen questions that 
measure time spent looking for work, working in multiple locations, and level of 
monitoring of employee performance. Participants were placed into one of four 
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categories based on their scores on these indices. Those in the High Precarity 
category had high levels of both Employment Relationship Uncertainty and 
Employment Relationship Effort. Those in the High Security category scored 
low on both indices. Those in Moderate Precarity had low scores on the 
Employment Relationship Uncertainty Index but high scores on the Employment 
Relationship Effort Index. Those in the Moderate Security category had high 
scores on the Employment Relationship Uncertainty Index but low scores on the 
Employment Relationship Effort Index.43
More than half of all respondents in the High Precarity category reported 
that using voice to express concerns about health and safety matters at work 
would have negative consequences for their future employment. Only one in 
ten respondents in the High Security category expressed the same view. These 
findings suggest that for many workers in precarious employment relationships 
voice is an ineffective means of resolving workplace health and safety concerns 
and that expressing health and safety concerns is itself a hazardous strategy.
fIguRE 4: RAISIng A HEALTH And SAfETy ConCERn WITH CuRREnT EmpLoyER 
WouLd nEgATIVELy AffECT fuTuRE EmpLoymEnT By dEgREE of EmpLoymEnT 
pRECARITy (% AgREEmEnT)
NOTE: The reported values for High Precarity (n=1,230), Moderate Precarity 
(n=446), and Moderate Security (n=774) are all statistically different from the 
reported value for High Security (n=827) at p<.001 (two-sided t-Test for Equality 
of Means).
The preceding discussion does not make any distinction between those 
exposed to health and safety risks at work and those not so exposed. Knowing if 
43. For a fuller discussion of the construction of the indices, see ibid at 297-99. The original 
analysis, which focussed on health issues related to precarity, used different titles for the four 
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there are differences in using voice between those exposed and those not exposed 
to risks can help us assess the overall effectiveness of the Internal Responsibility 
System. It may also help us assess if the IRS is more effective for certain classes of 
risk. Data were collected on four major risk factors: uncomfortable temperature, 
poor air quality, noise, and exposure to toxic substances. Figure 5 reports findings 
for those exposed and not exposed to each of these four categories of risk.44
fIguRE 5: RAISIng A HEALTH And SAfETy ConCERn WITH CuRREnT EmpLoyER 
WouLd nEgATIVELy AffECT fuTuRE EmpLoymEnT By RISk ExpoSuRE 
(% AgREEmEnT)
NOTES: Uncomfortable Temperatures (Exposed, n=869; Not Exposed, n=2,407), 
Poor Air (Exposed, n=723; Not Exposed, n=2,553), Noise (Exposed, n=571; 
Not Exposed, n=2,703), and Toxic Substances (Exposed, n=333; Not Exposed, 
n=2,942). In all four cases, the difference between Exposed and Not Exposed is 
statistically significant at p<.001 (Pearson’s Chi-squared).
Participants who reported that they were exposed to any one of the 
four groups of workplace hazards were significantly more likely to reply that 
raising a health and safety concern would have negative effects on their future 
employment. This suggests that while about one-third of the entire sample 
were concerned about the effects of using voice to affect health and safety 
improvements at work, among those who are actually exposed to these risks, the 
44. Respondents were asked to respond to the following questions: (a) “In the last month at work, 
how often did you work in uncomfortable temperatures?”; (b) “In the last month at work, how 
often did you experience discomfort because of air quality (dust, molds, smoke, chemicals, et 
cetera)?”; (c) “In the last month at work, how often was it necessary to raise your voice to be 
heard by a person next to you?”; and (d) “In the last month at work, how often was it necessary 
for you to use toxic substances?” For each question, respondents could select one of the 
following answers: all the time, three-quarters, half the time, one-quarter, or never. Respondents 
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proportion is closer to half of all exposed workers. For workers who reported 
exposure to toxic materials, closer to two-thirds reported that raising concerns 
about this exposure would negatively affect future employment. These results 
suggest that workers not exposed to risks find it easier to claim that voicing such 
a concern would not affect future employment. However, for the group facing 
these risks, whose members have to weigh more carefully the consequences of 
demanding changes, there appears to be much greater reluctance to use voice. 
B. WHo IS LIkELy To uSE VoICE To ExpRESS HEALTH And SAfETy 
ConCERnS AT WoRk?
I now examine how the different factors introduced in Part III(A), above, interact 
to influence fears about using voice to raise health and safety concerns at work. 
I estimate a number of different models of increasing complexity to assess how 
sex, race, unionization, sector, and employment precarity affect the probability 
of a participant reporting that voicing a health and safety concern at work would 
negatively affect his or her future employment.
TABLE 1: LIkELIHood of AgREEIng THAT RAISIng A HEALTH And SAfETy 
ConCERn WITH CuRREnT EmpLoyER WouLd nEgATIVELy AffECT fuTuRE 
EmpLoymEnT (oddS RATIoS)
 1a 2 3b 4 5 6 7
Female 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.77** 0.76** 0.80** 0.78** 0.81**
White 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.49***
Public Sector 1.13 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.93
Retail Hospitality 1.19 1.20 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.84 0.92
Manufacturing/Construction 1.32** 1.31** 1.07 1.01 0.99 0.94 1.06
Union 1.48*** 1.50*** 1.31** 1.31** 1.28** 1.26**
High Precarity  7.56*** 6.73*** 6.72*** 6.47*** 6.61***
Moderate Precarity 3.06*** 2.88*** 2.91*** 2.84*** 3.03***
Moderate Security  2.50*** 2.43*** 2.43*** 2.38*** 2.44***
Exposed to Temperature 2.17***
Exposed to Poor Air 2.42***
Exposed to Noise 2.52***
Exposed to Toxic Substances 3.00***
R2 .03 .04 .12 .14 .14 .14 .14
NOTE: The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for responses coded as “yes” to the question of 
whether raising a health and safety concern with one’s current employer would negatively affect one’s 
future employment. 
a Sector coefficients are relative to jobs classified as science, technology, or management. 
b Precarity coefficients are relative to High Security. 
**p<.01   ***p<.001
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Each column in Table 1 represents a single estimation model where the 
dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the participant agreed that raising a 
health and safety concern would negatively affect future employment and 0 
otherwise. The independent variables take the value of 1 if the individual has the 
characteristic indicated and 0 otherwise. Logistic regression analysis was used. 
Coefficients less than 1 indicate that individuals with these characteristics have 
a lower probability of reporting that voicing health and safety concerns would 
negatively impact future employment. Coefficients greater than 1 indicate a 
higher probability of reporting that voicing concerns about health and safety at 
work would negatively affect future employment.
Column 1 explores how sex, race, and sector affect the use of voice. 
Confirming the findings above, women were about 25% less likely than men 
to be concerned about using voice, while white workers were half as likely 
as workers from racialized minorities to be concerned about using voice. 
Workers in manufacturing and construction were marginally more likely than 
workers in all sectors to report that raising a health and safety issue would 
negatively affect future employment. Column 2 adds whether the respondent 
was unionized. This factor had an insignificant impact on the sex, race, and 
sector coefficients. Being in a union made it about 50% more likely that a 
respondent would report that raising a health and safety concern would 
negatively affect future employment.
Column 3 adds measures of employment precarity. The excluded category 
is High Security employment relationships, and the precarity coefficients are 
probabilities relative to this excluded group. There were only marginal changes 
in the probability that women, white workers, or unionized workers might be 
concerned about using voice. Sector is no longer statistically significant. Far 
more important is the sizeable effect associated with not being in a High Security 
employment relationship. Even those in Moderate Security relationships were 
more than twice as likely to report that voicing concerns about health and safety 
matters at work would negatively affect future employment. Respondents in the 
High Precarity category were more than seven times as likely to report that using 
voice would negatively affect future employment. The degree of employment 
precarity is far more important than sex, race, sector, or union status in shaping 
workers’ probability of agreeing that exercising voice with their current employer 
would negatively affect their future employment. It seems reasonable to infer 
that those who agree that raising a health and safety concern with their current 
employer would negatively affect their future employment are also less likely to 
exercise voice.
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Columns 4 through 7 introduce the level of exposure to one of the four 
categories of risk into the models. Controlling for exposure to risks leaves the sex, 
race, and sector effects virtually unchanged. Controlling for exposure reduced 
the effect of being unionized by about 50%. This suggests that a significant 
component of the union effect results from unionized respondents’ greater likeli-
hood of exposure to health and safety risks compared to non-union respondents. 
Being exposed to a risk generally increased the likelihood of reporting a negative 
effect from raising a health and safety issue. The impact of being in a precarious 
employment relationship is also somewhat muted, but even after controlling for 
exposure, respondents in precarious employment relationships were more likely 
to be concerned about the effect of voice on future employment than workers in 
High Security relationships.
While these findings on their own are of concern given the important role 
of voice in the Internal Responsibility System, the survey data also suggest that 
this reluctance to use voice is negatively affecting health outcomes (see Figure 6). 
fIguRE 6: SELf-REpoRTEd HEALTH STATuS By AgREEmEnT THAT RAISIng A 
HEALTH And SAfETy ConCERn WITH CuRREnT EmpLoyER WouLd nEgATIVELy 
AffECT fuTuRE EmpLoymEnT (%)
NOTES: Poor Health (Yes, n=993; No, n=2,282), Poor Mental Health (Yes, n=994; 
No, n=2,279), and Exhausted After Work Most Days (Yes, n=995; No, n=2,281). In 
all three cases, the difference between Yes and No is statistically significant at p<.001 
(Pearson’s Chi-squared).
Figure 6 shows that respondents who reported that voicing health and safety 
concerns would negatively affect future employment were more than twice as 
likely to report poor or fair health, more than twice as likely to report poor or 
fair mental health, and almost twice as likely to report feeling exhausted most 
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would negatively affect future employment.45 Part of this difference may reflect 
the greater probability of being exposed to health risks at work among those 
concerned about raising health and safety issues. Nonetheless, the findings still 
suggest that not exercising voice can have negative health consequences.
IV. dISCuSSIon: THE LImITS of VoICE
The objective of this article is to use survey data to assess the willingness of 
workers to use voice at work to raise concerns about health and safety matters. 
Voice is a key pillar of the Internal Responsibility System. The article uses 
responses to a question that asked survey participants if raising a health 
and safety issue with their current employer would have negative future 
employment consequences. It was assumed that workers who were concerned 
about the impact on future employment would also be less likely to use voice 
in health and safety matters.
One of the limits of this article is that the sample is restricted to currently 
employed workers aged twenty-five to sixty-five. The inclusion of younger 
workers, who on average tend to be employed in less secure forms of employment, 
may exaggerate reluctance to use voice at work. On the other hand, limiting the 
sample to those employed may underestimate the likelihood of workers agreeing 
that using voice at work would negatively affect future employment, because 
voicing health and safety concerns may have put some of the unemployed out of 
their previous job.
The overall finding of the article is that a significant number of survey 
participants feared that raising a health and safety concern would have negative 
employment effects. In the sample as a whole, about one-third expressed such a 
concern and, among those who also reported being exposed to health and safety 
risks at work, more than half reported that raising health and safety concerns 
would have negative employment consequences. Particularly troublesome was 
the number of participants exposed to toxic substances who also reported that 
using voice would have negative employment consequences. This suggests that 
45. Respondents were asked to rate both their health and mental health either as excellent, very 
good, good, fair, or poor. They were classified as having poor health or poor mental health if they 
reported that their health or mental health was less than good. Respondents were also asked: “In 
the last month, how often have you felt exhausted after your workday?” They could select one of 
the following answers: every day, most days, half the days, a few days, or never. Respondents were 
classified as exhausted after work most days if they answered every day or most days.
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some of the most troubling health and safety risks at work are also those that 
workers are the least likely to use their voice to try to resolve.
The finding that union members and men were more likely to report 
that voicing concerns about health and safety matters would have negative 
employment consequences is contrary to general assumptions that unions and 
men are in stronger positions to voice such concerns at work. About half of the 
union effect was explained by the higher probability of exposure to health risks 
in unionized workplaces. However, even after correcting for this factor, unionized 
workers were still about 25% more likely than non-unionized workers to report 
that raising a health and safety risk would negatively affect future employment. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to explain this finding. Clearly, the overall 
decline of union power since the 1990s, downsizing in both the private and 
the public sectors, and efforts to reduce the wages and benefits of unionized 
workers may all be creating a context in which unionized workers have become 
more willing to accept health hazards rather than risk losing what has become 
relatively privileged employment.
It is worth noting that unions were the leading critics of the IRS during the 
recent expert panel review of occupational health and safety in Ontario. Several 
unions that submitted briefs to the review panel called for increased external 
enforcement of health and safety regulations in light of their growing inability 
to effect change through the IRS.46 Neil Gunningham has reported a similar 
development in Australia, where unions have become weaker in the mining 
sector and more reticent to raise health and safety issues.47
Finally, the finding that respondents in highly precarious employment 
relationships were more likely to report that raising health and safety concerns 
would have negative employment consequences is not surprising. Perhaps what 
is surprising is the magnitude of the difference between those in precarious and 
those in secure employment relationships. The precariously employed were six to 
seven times more likely to report that raising health and safety issues would have 
negative employment consequences.
46. See Wayne Lewchuk, “The Limits and Possibilities of the Structures and Procedures for 
Health and Safety Regulation” in Theo Nichols & David Walters, eds, Governance, Change, 
and the Work Environment: Safety, Profit and the Conventional Wisdom (Amityville, NY: 
Baywood) [forthcoming in 2013].
47. Supra note 34.
(2013) 50 osgoode Hall law Journal812
V. ConCLuSIon: A nEEd foR ExTERnAL REguLATIon 
And oVERSIgHT In THE moST InSECuRE SECToRS
The findings reported above raise serious questions regarding the ability of 
the Internal Responsibility System to deliver safer and healthier workplaces in 
the context of growing employment insecurity. If in the 1970s it was true that 
workers could be expected to voice their concerns by participating in health and 
safety committees, by demanding to know about the risks they were facing, and 
by refusing dangerous work, this seems to be less true for a growing number 
of workers in Ontario today. I have shown that for many of the precariously 
employed, exercising these rights comes with a significant perceived risk of 
negative effects on future employment, possibly including losing their jobs. 
These findings suggest that serious consideration needs to be given to increasing 
reliance on external regulation and inspection of workplace health and safety 
issues and decreasing reliance on the IRS in sectors where employment is 
most insecure.
